It is undeniable that the particular characteristics of each electoral system influences the potential effective enforcement of quotas. In the case of Uruguay, there are characteristics that, as Gemma notes, are usually seen as “favorable” to the effective enforcement of quotas (a high degree of proportionality, closed lists). The application of a minimum quota of one third (the mechanism recently approved in the Uruguayan Senate) would have led to the election of 10 more women parliamentarians in 2004, taking the women’s representation rate from 10.8% to 18.5% – a substantial increase. However, the impact in the 1999 elections would have been much less: only three more women elected (increasing the women’s representation rate from 11.6% to 14.7%). What do the results of these simulations tell us? Are quotas effective as mechanisms for increasing the presence of women in elected office? What these simulations tell us is that there are other factors in the Uruguayan electoral system that also affect the impact of quotas. One is a structural characteristic of the system, which essentially limits the effectiveness of quotas, and that is the fact that half of the seats in the House of Representatives belong to small, two- or three-seat constituencies where, therefore, a quota of one third has no impact. The other is the highly fragmented parliament, the result of a party system made up of groups composed of different sectors, each of which puts forward their own list in the elections; in other words, even in the larger constituencies many lists win few seats. In the parliamentary debate in 2003 in which the proposed quotas law failed to pass the reading in the lower house, the opponents (who included women) of the measure used these figures to “demonstrate” that quotas “are not effective.” Personally, I do not believe the issue is as black and white as that. The figures showed that quotas do generate an increase in the women’s representation rate but their effectiveness is limited by the Uruguayan electoral system and, therefore, would have to be accompanied by other measures to promote access for women to positions of power. In sum, clearly it is important to do simulations before introducing quotas, in order to envisage their real impact on adoption. On the other hand, the experience of quotas in countries like Argentina and Costa Rica show that the “slight differences” in “a certain percentage” of places in lists are very often what actually determine the effectiveness of the mechanism. Thus, in the case of Argentina, the specific definition that was given in 2000 (nine years after the Quotas Law was passed) to the term “electable places” significantly enhanced the effectiveness of quotas. The participants in this discussion may be interested to know about a book published by Nélida Archenti and Maria Inés Tula entitled “Mujeres y política en América Latina: Sistemas electorales y cuotas de género” [Women in Politics in Latin America: Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas] (Ed. Heliasta), which contains case studies on 10 Latin American countries that explore the link between electoral systems and the impact of quotas. Niki Johnson Coordinator, Politics and Gender Area, Department of Political Science, Universidad de la República, Uruguay This comment was originally posted on the Spanish E-Discussion Forum at http://www.iknowpolitics.org/es/node/5935#comment-1861

Legal justification of gender quota: articles 1 and 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulate the two interrelated principles of equality and non-discrimination for all human beings, men and women. Most of the modern constitutions have integrated this set of principles as a cornerstone of democracy. In order to make equality effective in a given society, some more advanced constitutions go so far as to introduce the principle of positive discrimination for marginalised groups. Following this principle, it becomes legal to remove by law the obstacles which impede these social groups to have access to their rights: civil and political as well as social and economic…As far as gender equality is concerned, quota laws respond precisely to the need of removing socio-economic obstacles to the participation of women in the decision-making process. In doing so, they represent a legitimate legal instrument directly stemming from the equality principle, enshrined in most of the modern constitutions. Socio-economic justification of gender quota: In most cases, quota laws represent a crucial and sometimes essential legal tool to help overcome the heavy weight of traditions and gender stereotypes, which is often stronger than the political will to promote the engagement of women in politics. Mauritanian experience: Before the 2006-2007 legislative and municipal elections, women’s representation in decision-making spheres was rather insignificant (less than 3% in the Parliament, Municipalities and high State positions). In the aftermath of the bloodless military coup of august 2005, an advocacy group, issued by the civil society and supported by the international community, has officially asked to and obtained from the Military Council for Justice and Development a pledge for a quota of 20 % of female representation in the new legislative institutions. This advocacy has resulted into a quota law stating that 20% of the candidates in electoral lists should be women rather then it going directly on legislative seats. Here are some of the issues related to the implementation of this law: 1. The mainly majoritarian electoral system in Mauritania does not facilitate female access to electoral functions. Therefore, women candidates have to be placed at strategic points in their lists ( 1st or 2nd , 6th, 11th , etc..) in order to be sure to be elected . Proportional electoral systems are in general more suitable to guarantee an easier access to the legislative posts for women. 2. The current electoral districts, being too small, do not suit an optimal female representation. It would have been better to present female candidates rather on the national lists, in order to avoid their being dispersed in small districts. 3. As to the implementation modalities, financial incentives to political parties presenting a higher number of female candidates than the minimum 20% were provided, while a review committee was in charge of examining the electoral lists with powers to reject the ones which did not respect the 20% quota for women. 4. There was no obligation for political parties to appoint women head of legislative and municipal lists. In spite of the above-mentioned imperfections, the quota law led to a positive outcome, raising the percentage of female representation from 3% to 18% in the Parliament (beyond the 15% expected) and reaching over 30% of female representation in the municipal councils (beyond the quota); yet, only 4 women maires were elected out of 216. As to an optimal quota percentage, ideally, one should aim at 30% percent of female representation, which is considered to be the minimum percentage to have a critical minority, which is able to influence the decision-making. However, it is difficult to hit this target from the start in countries with a high level of illiteracy and where the democratic process is still young. In such cases, it is better to proceed step by step, by increasing gradually over the years the percentage of quota laws. Submitted by: Alessandra Pellizzeri Governance Programme Officer, UNDP Mauritania

It is essential to get gender and age quotas into all possible legislative, state and political party policy documents. For instance, quotas in Election Codes, in Constitutions, internal by-laws of State institutions providing public services can help to increase the number of women, including young women, in decision-making bodies at all levels. In Kyrgyzstan, parliamentary election held on December 16, 2007 was based on gender quotas (party lists had to have at least every fourth seat reserved for a different gender to be eligible to register for the elections) got 24 women elected into the national Parliament - Jogoru Kenesh. It was very positive that gender quotas were combined with age quotas. Now women's NGOs plan to introduce gender quotas for nominated high level positions in state institutions working in public service sector and in local elections. Without gender quotas it is not possible to get high political positions for women. Such positions are important for many reasons, but one of them is that women get a chance to gain first hand political experience. Political skills and deep knowledge can be gained only through practicing political decision-making, to which women usually have limited access. Nurgul Djanaeva Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan

In the Pacific, the issue of temporary special measure to improve women's participation in national and (where relevant, provincial) parliaments is very topical. As the 2008 IPU Report on women's representation observed, between 1995 and 2008, women's participation has stayed static at an average of 2.5% in the Pacific (excluding Australia and NZ). We have the lowest numbers of women in parliaments around the world and in 13 years, despite considerable efforts on the parts of women's groups in the region, we have made little if any progress. There are some countries in the Pacific which have fared better than others. Most notably, the French territories of the Pacific have much higher numbers of women MPs (often around 30%). Many have suggested this may because those countries have proportional representation systems which have enabled the use of party and/or list quotas to improve women's representation. Conversely, the rest of the Pacific has electoral systems which are usually a version of first past the post or preferential voting. They most commonly use single member constituencies. Many of these countries also have relatively weak party systems or (usually because of the very small size of their parliaments) no party system at all (eg. Tuvalu has 15 MPs, Nauru has 18 MPs, FSM has 15 Senators). The interaction of electoral systems and weak parties means that quotas may be difficult to introduce in the Pacific. A country like Fiji could possibly introduce party quotas because their parties are quite strong, but in Solomon Islands for example, where the biggest party is called the Association of INDEPENDENT Members (!), quotas would have less impact. As a result, many activists in the region are increasingly looking at the possibilities offered by reserving seats for women. For example, in Bougainville, a small post-conflict region of Papua New Guinea, when they developed their new constitution, they set up an Assembly with 37 open seats + 3 reserved seats for women and 3 reserved seats for ex-combatants. As a result, they now have more women in parliament than at the national level (the national parliament of PNG has 109 MPs and only 1 is a women). The Deputy Speaker of Bougainville is a woman. PNG has also introduced reserved seats for women at provincial level, but there is less information available about how successful this has been. Sincerely, Charmaine Rodrigues Legislative strengthening expert/UNDP